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FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNT?
Marlo B, Lamberte
I. INTRODUCTION
The paper attempts to study the Philippines' experience with
financial liberalization. Specifically, it examinesthe impact of inte-
rest rate reforms on the flow of Ioanable funds. It should be noted
that there were other financial reforms introduced in the system
other than interest rate reforms. But for this paper, we focus mainly
on interest rate reforms andthe flow of Ioanable funds in the orga-
nized financial market.
The next section briefly sketchesthe flow of funds from primary
savers to ultimate users of funds. It demonstrates the degree of
sophistication achieved by the Philippine financial system. Section
III examines the impact of interest rate reforms on the flow of
Ioanablefunds. The lastsection concludesthe'study.
ii. THE FLOW OF LOANABLE FUNDS
The essenceof financial intermediation is to increasethe flow
of funds from surplus units or primary saversto ultimate usersof
funds at least cost. Financial institutions can do this by offering
financial assetsthat would suit the preferences (in terms of yield,
liquidity, riskiness) of wealth-holders so that the latter could be
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induced to shift from holding physicalassetsto financial assets.
At the other end, financial institutions could ensurethat savings
areallocatedto themostproductiveeconomicactivities.
Figure 1 presentsa simplified sketchof the flow of funds from
primary saversto ultimate users of funds in the Philippines. It
suggeststhat a certain degreeof sophistication has already been
attained by the financial system. The proliferation of financial
institutions, as may be gathered from Table 1, makes available
a wider variety of financial assetsto wealth-holders,on the one
hand, and a wider set of finance choicesfor entrepreneurs,on the
other.
The figure emphasizesthe presenceof government financial
institutions in the financial system.They tend to be largeand are
organizedfor specificpurposes.Except for the PhilippineNational
Bank (PNB), they do little intcrmediation outside of their captive
depositors, and instead rely more heavily on support from the
Treasuryand the Central Bank, and on foreign borrowings.More
recently, thesegovernment institutions havegained control over a
numberof commercialbanksthat usedto beownedor controlled by
the privatesecotr. Specifically,the DevelopmentBankof thePhilip-
pines (DBP) now controls the AssociatedBank; the Government
Social InsuranceSystem (GSIS), the CommercialBank of Manila',
the National DevelopmentCorporation, the International Corpor;i-
tion Bank; the SocialSecurity System,the Union Bank;and PNB,
the Pilipinas Bank. Unlike specializedgovernment banks, these
government-controlled commercial banks compete directly with
private commercialbanks in both the deposit and loan markets.
Being government-controlledbanks, they definitely have an edge
overprivately-ownedbanks.
The flow of funds from surplus units to deficit units isdeter-
mined by a host of factors. We will mention only a few of those
factors here. If the interest rate is administratively set at levels
substantially below the market rate, then surplus units would shy
away from holding financial instruments. At the other end, funds
tend to be misallocated,thus reducingthe amount to be ploughed
back into the system. A high inflation rate resulting in negative
interest rates would certainly drive away saversfrom the financial
system.Surplusunits would mostlikely hold nonproductivephysical
assets leastadverselyaffectedby upwardpricemovements.
Another factor that determinesthe flow of Ioanablefunds isthe276 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
TABLE 1
PHILIPPINE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN 1983;





A. CentralBank 130,371.7 - 1
B. FinancialSystem 354,606.2 84.8
Bankinginstitutions 326,013.0 78.0 1,122
Commercial Banks 235,040.4 56,2 34
PNB 70,502.3 16.9 1
Thrift Banks 16,149.0 3.9 136
PDBs 4,613.2 1.1 45
Savings andmortgagebanks 7,399.4 1.8 8
StockSLAs 4,136.4 1.0 83
Ruralbanks 9,499.7 2.3 949
Special government banks 65,323.9 15.6 3
DBP 56,529.713.5 13.5 1
Land Bank 8,530.2 2.0 1
Phil.AmanahBank 264.0 0.1 1
Nonbankf nancialinstitutions 28,593.2 6.8 1,474
Investment houses 7,210.4 1.7 14
Finance companies 11,810.8 2.8 336
Investment companies 6,159.9 1.5 65
Securitiesdealersbrokers 683.0 0.2 124
Pawnshops 483.1 0.1 701
Fundmanagers 1,529.6 0.4 12
LendingInvestors 49.2 0.0 120
Nonstock SLAs 648.3 0.2 74
MBLA • 18.9 0.0 7
C. OtherFinancialInstitutions 63,485.2 15.2
Privateinsurance companies 13,715.7 3.3 136
Specialnonbanks 49,658.3 11.9
GSIS 14,707.2 3.5 1
SSS 16,227.1 3.9 1
ACA -- --
NIDC,PHIVIDEC,NHMFC
and NDC 18,724.0 4.5
VentureCapitalCorp. 111.2 0.0 15
D.Offshore Banking Units (OBUS) $4,408.0 -- 21
Total (B+ C) 418,091.4 100 0
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stability of the entire financial system. An unstable financial system
would drive out potential financial savers. The instability of the
financial system can often be traced to the risky portfolio held by
banks.
There is one aspect of Figure 1 that is worth emphasizing, that
is, the role of budget deficits. If the fiscal sector decides to finance
its budget deficits by borrowing from the Central Bank and deposit
money banks, then less funds would fl0w to private productive eco-
nomic units. It is noteworthy that borrowing from the Central
Bank is definitely an easiertask for the Finance Minister than raising
taxes, especially if he is also a member of the Monetary Board. Aside
from being inflationary, this could be one source of instability in
the financial system since a massive support given by the Central
Bank to the fiscal sector could weaken its ability to stabilize the
economy in times of crisis.
III. FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND RESULTS
Financial repression in the Philippines hasits long historical roots
(see Lamberte 1985). The Usury Act of 1916 prescribed interest
ceilings on secured and unsecured loans. When the Central Bank was
set up, it merely accepted the Usury Act as a datum and instituted
ceilings on deposit rates starting in 1956. It took a long time before
the Central Bank initiated interest rate reforms.
Interest rate reforms can be accomplished either by permitting
nominal interest rates to be determined by market forces or by exer-
cising administrative control over interest rates in a flexible manner
that is responsive to market conditions. The Philippines opted for
initiating interest rate reforms in stages. As identified by Laya
(1982), there are three distinct interest rate regimes: (a) 1956-73:
the low interest rate regime; (b) 1974-80: the transition period
during which interest rates were still fixed but frequently adjusted
to reflect market conditions; and (c) 1981-present: the floating
interest rate regime. The question that this section attempts to
answer is: What is the impact of interest rate reforms on the flow
of Ioanable funds? To help us understand the results of the liberal-
ization efforts, we refer to a simple analytical framework mainly
drawn from McKinnon (1981).
Let us begin by assuming that all individuals behave according
to the "Fisher Effect" model; that is, all individuals would ask forLAMBERTE: FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 279
a nominal rate of interest that already embodies an inflation pre-
mium that is sufficient to compensate them for the expected loss of
purchasing power associated with the receipt of future pesos.Speci-
fically,
rL = iL _ _e for lenders, and
rD = /D --/_ for depositors (1)
where rL = real loan rate,
rz) = real deposit rate,
iL = nominal loan rate,
iD = nominal deposit rate, and
/_e = expected inflation rate.
Under an ideal situation where/_e = 0 and where there are no
market distortions, equilibrium is obtained at point a in Figure 2,
where supply and demand for Ioanable funds are equated, i.e., L = D.
At this point, rL = ro. The effect of interest rate repression which
prescribes, ceilings on lending rate at r_' < rL and on deposit rate at
rD < r_. is clear. Supply of Ionable funds is substantially reduced to
19," leaving the market with a large excessdemand for Ioanable funds.
Rationing is often resorted to, which does not actually discriminate
between profitable and nonprofitable projects, thus compounding
further the problem of excessdemand for Ioanable funds.
So far, the analysis compares the consequences of financial
repression and liberazation on the flow of Ioanable funds. It un-
ambiguously shows the favorable impact of interest rate liberaliza-
tion on the flow of Ionable funds. But it implicitly assumesthe
absence of factors that impinge on a successful switch from a re-
pressed to a liberalized financial system. In actual practice, the
switch from a repressed to a liberalized financial system is a tricky
businessthat sometimes may result in failure instead of success.This
will beconsidered next.
Suppose that ceilings on nominal interest rates are removed.
However, the Central Bank imposes reserveson the deposit liabilities
of banks. It will be shown below that the imposition of reserve re-
quirement on deposit liabilities results in higher loan ratesand lower
deposit rates, thus reducing the flow of Ioanable funds. The effect is

































TLAMBERTE: FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 281
L, = (1-.k)D
when L = supply ofloanable funds (2)
D = volume of deposits,and
h = reserverequirement ratio.
Note that the supply of Ioanable funds is now less than the
supply of deposits, i.e., L < D. If banks were to attain at least zero
profits, then
_L L = ioO (3)
or i iO
JL - 1-h
Subtracting/_e from both sidesof equation (3) and substituting
rD + l_efor io., we get
- r° + rL 1--h -- (4)
Equation (4) states that the real loan rate that yields at least zero
profits for banks is positively influenced by rD, 15"and h.
The combined effect of/_" and h or rL is illustrated in Figure 3.
With h = 0 and 15e= O,equilibrium isattained at a, and r = rD = rL . If
h >0, then the deposits curve would shift to the left, from D to D."
But note that the loan and-deposit rates would not be equal to r."
Instead,the loan rate would be at rL >r'and the deposit rate would
be at rD < r." If we add the condition that/_" > 0, then the real loan
rate at which banks realize at leastzero profits would be higher than
if _e = 0, and the real deposit rate would be further reduced, thus
making deposit instruments less attractive to surplus units. The loci
of real loan rates shown in Figure 3 for different inflation rates are
actually derived from Table 2. It shows, for example, that if h=20%
and 15"=10%,then for a zero real deposit rate, banks' real loan rates
should be 2.5 percent to obtain at least zero profits. But if/_e=20%,
then for the same reserve requirement ratio and real deposit rate,
banks' real loan rate should be raised to 5 percent. This means that
ahigher inflation rate would lead to a higher bank spread.
There is one important dimension in our analysis that must be
brought out. When lending rates are high during an inflationaryTABLE 2 ¢o
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period, adverse risk selection would likely result; that is, only bor-
rowers who are willing to take risks and who expect higher returns
on their investment would come forwara. Indeed, this brings instabi-
lity into the financial system. As a result, risk-averse saverswould
withdraw their funds from the system, thus compounding further
the unfavorable effect of high inflation rate on the flow of loanabl¢
funds.
Thus, our analysis suggeststhat low inflation rate is an important
requirement to a successful switch from a repressed to a liberalized
financial system. There are, of course, Other requirements other than
low inflation rate. Instead of discussing all of them here, we mainly
focus on one additional requirement which is deemedvery important
in view of the current situation of the financial system.
Suppose that banks are completely deregulated. For example,
they can take on any liquidity ratio that would satisfy their prefe-
rences. Upon perceiving this situation, savers would likely ask for a
higher real deposit rate to compensate for the additional risk. But
as expressed in equation (4), banks, in turn, will charge higher loan
rates to achieve at least zero profits. Again, adverse risk selection
occurs, bringing instability to the financial system. The end result,
of course, is a much lower supply of loanable funds. This suggests
that, even under a regime of floating interest rate, some forms of
regulation must be exercised by the Central Bank to reduce riski-
nessin the portfolio of banks.
The framework discussed above will guide our analysis of the
Philippines' experience with interest rate liberalization. In the follow-
ing, we examine the impact of the change in interest rate policy
during the period 1956-84 on the flow of loanable funds. Determin-
ing the appropriate measure of the flow of loanable funds is indeed
a big problem. In this regard, McKinnon (1982) suggested the use
of the ratio of money supply to GNP as a measure of the flow of
loanable funds since in a less developed economy it "is indicative
of the absolute size of the banking system that reinvests funds,
in potentially new directions, from old loans as they mature" (p.
367). McKinnon's measure of the flow of loanable funds isadopted
in this study.
Table 3 shows selected financial and economic indicators. The
increasing M2/M1 and M3/M1 ratios reflect the growing sophis-
tication in financial intermediation as savers respond accordingly
by moving their funds from low- to high:yielding financial assets.TABLE 3
SELECTED FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS m
(Figureare averages for theperiod) 23m
--t
m
Financialratios Reatinterest Lending GNP Infla- Budget _.
Regimes M2/M1 M3/M1 rates rate* Growth tion deft-
M2/GNP M3/GNP SD TD rate rate cits** z
I. Low Interest r-
Rate Regime r- m











1981-84 3.06 3.65 .22 .27 -10.58 -1.62 2.6 .19 20.78 2_89
a_ From 1966 to I973.
* For lessthan 730 dayssecuredloans.
** As a percentageof GNP.
Notes: M1 = currency in circulation + demanddeposits
M2 = M1 + savings andtime deposits
M3 = M2 + depositsubstitutes
SD =savings deposits
O0
TD = time deposits m286 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
One can immediately Observefrom Table 3 that, asan economy
moved from the rigid and low interest rate regime to the transition
period, the average M3/GNP ratio increased from 23 to 27 percent,
indicating that the move towards a regime when interest rates were
still administratively fixed but constantly adjusted by the Monetary
Board to reflect market conditions did produce favorable results.
However, the move towards a fully flexible interest fate regime did
not increase at all the flow of Ioanable funds.
Why did the switch towards a fully liberalized regime fail to
produce the desired results? To answer this question, we have to
look at other aspects of the operating financial policy framework.
During the floating interest rate period, the Central Bank opened
a lot of rediscounting windows that virtually nullified the selective-
ness of its selective credit program (see Table 4). This caused dis-
intermediation in two ways. First, both private and government-
owned banks took this opportunity by increasing their borrowings
from the Central Bank. Thus, they became mere conduits of Central
Bank funds intead of intermediaries mobilizing the funds of surplus
units. Second, the inflationary impact of this expansionary policy
discouraged surplus units from investing their funds in financial
assetsyielding negative real returns. The table above shows that the
floating interest rate period was characterized by an average infla-
tion rate substantially higher than that of the previous regimes.
Fiscal deficits are another aspect that must be examined. As can
be observed in Table 3, the averagefiscal deficits for each subperiod
have been rising and seem to be positively correlated with the average
inflation rate. It ,should be noted th_ata significant portion of the
budget deficits was financed by the Central Bank. For example,
borrowings by government from the Cefitral Bank through the
"rediscounting with the government" facility averagedt=2.5 billion
annually between 1980 and 1987. It already reached t_3.5 billion
during the first half of 1983 (San jose 1983). So, to help bring down
inflation, fiscal discipline must be instilled. Or, at the minimum, the
central Bank should not be called upon to finance budget deficits.
But this is a tall order in a setting wherein the Central Bank is not
entirely independent from the fiscal sector. Perhaps, it is high time
we had a Central Bank that is completely independent of the fiscal
sector. Only then will the fiscal sector be forced to be extra careful
in managing Rsideficits, while the Central Bank can pursue its task
of stabilizing the economy more effectively.LAMBERTE: FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 287
TABLE 4
REDISCOUNTING WINDOWSOF THE CENTRAL BANK
Facility Implementing Date Loan Rediscount Lending Maturities
Circular Value(%) Rate(%) Rate(%)
A, RegularRedlscounting
1, Supervised credits 784 Feb,97,1981 100 3 12 120days
1. Supervised credits 784 Feb.27, 1981 100 3 12 120days
2. Nonsoperviscd credits 784 Feb.27, 1981 80 g 1_ 60 days/120days/
270 days
3, Small/medium scale 784 Feb.27, 1981 go g 14 120to 270days
industry
4; Exports 784 Feb,27, 1981
Nontraditional 3 12 90 days
Traditional 80 8 14 10-40daysfor sightdrafts/
120-170daysfor production
credits
5, Masaganang Maisan 828 Oct.9, 1981 100 3 15 120-270days
6. Special programs
NGA, FTI 784 Feb. 27, 1981 100 3 6 180 days
GrainsQucdan/
FoodQucdan 881 June25, 1982 80 3 10 190days
7, Taxcredit
certificates 802 June1,1981 80 8 14 180days





9, Energygenerating 803_B72 June18,1981/
projects April 26, 1982
Mini-hydro 100 3 10
Dendrothermal 100 3 8
10 Stockfinancing 807-851 June26,1981/ 80 8 14 180days
Feb.15, 1982
1.Metal financing 873 May 6,1982 80 8 14 90 dayswith another
90 daysreliever
12. Dollarredis- 875-944 May 21,1982/ 90 dws
counting Aug. 1S, 1983
Dollarssoldto CB 100 12 - 90 daysrenewable for
90 days
Dollarsdeposited 100 12 - :368daysormaturity
with CB whichever comes first
13. Manpower 842_94_]95 Jan.29,1983/ 80 3 12 180days
exporters Sept,24_1982
14. Orchardgrowing/ Circular Oct. 23,1982 80 8 14 . 120days
uplandfarming latter
15. Congress organizers 918 Jan,6, 1983 80 3 12 180days, ,
16, Coconutmillers/ 921 March28_1983 80 3 12 90 days
dessicators
B.8pcciaJRediscounting
1, Medlum-and long- 846 Feb.1,1982
term
- for acquisition of fixed 75 11 15 upto 10 years
assets non-renewable
- forworkingcapital 7=; 11 15 upto 3 year_
inconnection with a non-renewable
a proposed orenjoin8
expansion development
program288 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table4 (Continued)
Facility Implementing Date Loan Rediscount Lending Maturities
Circular Value(%) Rate(%) Ral_ (%)
- for investmentinaffiliates 70 14 - upto 7 years
andotherinstitutions non-renewable
- for investmentin high 70 14 - notto exceedoneyear
_'adesecurities
2 Lenderof last 749-862- Aug.1980 80%or





=-Commercialbahks MRRplus2% 90 days
ormore
- Thrift banks MRR plus2%
or more with S%
liquidity





C. Emergency Rediscount. Sec,90, Dec.24, 1982 16% 90 days
ing .RA265/907 or MRR
plus3%
D. Redis¢ounting Sec.95
with theGovernment RA 265
Source:SanJose(1983) pp. 16-17.
Finally, we should take note that the period 1981-84 was replete
with bank failures. The relative absence of regulatory controls by
the Central Bank over bank portfolio allowed banks to take on more
risky assets. Interestingly, the recent collapse of many banks can be
traced to questionable loans made by banks to their directors, offi-
cers, stockholders and related interests (DOSRI) which were not
closely monitored by the Central Bank. This suggests 'that even if
the financial system were deregulated, some forms of regulation
must be exercised by the Central Bank to reduce riskiness in the
portfolio of banks. This is essential to regain the people's confi-
dence in the system. Perhaps, standard financial ratios or other
financial ratios modified to suit the characteristics of the Philippine
financial institutions may be adopted to ensure their stability as the
financial system moves from a repressed to a liberalized one.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main lesson that can be drawn from the findings of the study
is that there are requirements to successful liberalization efforts.LAMBERTE: FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 289
One such requirement is the low inflation rate. Unfortunately,
the Central Bank pursued inflationary policies --especially those
related to rediscounting and financing budget deficits - at the time
when the financial sector was liberalized. The other requirement
pertains to some forms of regulation that must be exercised by the
Central Bank to reduce riskiness in the portfolio of banks. This is
to ensure the people's confidence in the banking system.
The failure of the recent liberalization efforts, therefore, can be
traced to inflationary policies and to the lack of effective regulations
on the part of the Central Bank to reduce the riskiness of the port-
folio of banks.
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